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THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM UNDER THE AMLO
ADMINISTRATION
By
Ava Ibanez*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the adoption of international arbitration, conflicts arose to determine what
governing law would rule in international disputes, and the differences of law and traditions
between sovereign nations exacerbated the conflict.1 However, international arbitration
balanced the legal differences between nations, and thus, provided a reliable adjudicatory
process for international contractual disputes that prioritized the interests of the parties
instead of the legal systems of each sovereign.2 Essentially, international arbitration
allowed parties to circumvent the complexity of the law of different nations by providing
an enforceable method of dispute resolution based on contractual agreements approved by
both parties.3 International arbitration not only supports foreign investment, it encourages
it.4 In fact, global commerce as we know it today may not have been possible without the
inception of international commercial arbitration.5 And, as will be discussed herein,
Mexico’s energy reform would also not have been possible without the aid that arbitration
provides to international dispute resolution.
Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of international commercial arbitration,
Latin-American countries have been some of the most arbitration-reluctant nations in the
world.6 This hesitation stems from political disorder and distrust in other nations, which
usually results in Latin-American countries imposition of sovereign immunities to
international agreements.7 Foreign investors are, therefore, less protected from having to
litigate solely under the law of a foreign nation, which renders international investment a
risky endeavor in Latin-America.8 Mexico’s energy reform serves as an example of a
*

Ava Ibanez is the Foreign Decisional Editor of The Arbitration Law Review and a 2020 Juris Doctor
Candidate at Penn State Law.
1

Thomas E. Carbonneau, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 329, 330 (4th ed. 2017).

2

Id.

3

Id. at 330.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 331.

6

Id. at 338-340.

7

Supra note 1, at 338.

8

Id. at 340.

250

nation’s legal scheme to protect its sovereignty while attempting to embrace arbitration
and foreign investment.
II. MEXICO’ ENERGY REFORM
A. Historical Context
For over 70 years, the Mexican State has operated under a policy of resource
nationalism. Resource nationalism stands for the idea that the nation’s natural resources
belong to the State and should solely serve its people.9 Under Article 27 of the Mexican
Constitution,
the Mexican nation alone [is authorized to] carry out all actions
pertaining to the oil and gas industry without any work being
performed by private companies, and secures the people of Mexico
all water and land, including mineral rights.10
Since 1938, the Mexican oil and gas sector has operated under this regime of
resource nationalism.11 In 1938, Mexico’s president - Lazaro Cardenas - officially closed
the oil and gas industry to foreign and private investors, which effectively gave the State
all control over oil and gas exploration and production.12 Since then, the idea of sovereign
power over the energy sector has become a part of Mexican culture.13 Mexican citizens
celebrate the day that oil was made exclusive for the State. This national holiday is known
as “El Dia de la Expropriacion Petrolera” or Oil Expropriation Day.14 Starting in the 1990s,
however, the State’s economic means to explore and exploit oil and gas became more
limited.15 In 2012, Mexico imported almost half the oil used in the country from foreign
nations, and Mexico’s economy suffered greatly given its heavy dependence on the success
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of the energy sector.16 This predicament forced the Mexican government to consider
opening the energy sector to private investors that could inject capital into the nation’s
exploration and production of oil and gas.17 The high demand for oil and gas in Mexico
and around the world presented a promising opportunity for the resource-rich nation.
Private investors could provide the technology and capital to extract the resources that
Mexico could not afford to exploit.18
Approximately 75 years after the expropriation of oil and gas in Mexico, in
December 2013, Mexico’s President– Enrique Pena Nieto (EPN) – signed the energy
reform into law.19 This event effectively opened the energy sector in Mexico and ceased
the national monopoly on oil and gas.20
B. Arbitration in Mexico
Latin-American countries have generally been unfriendly towards arbitration.21
However, Mexico, since its adoption of arbitration in the 1990s, has become one of the
leading Latin-American countries promoting and enforcing arbitration.22 In recent years,
Mexican courts have reinforced arbitration. For instance, several Mexican courts have
rendered decisions that protect arbitrators from being sued through an amparo action.23 An
amparo action is a legal remedy, modeled after habeas corpus, and used to challenge
“responsible authorities” for constitutional rights violations.24 Under amparo law, a
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“responsible authority” is usually equated to a governmental entity.25 In 2013, amendments
to the amparo law in Mexico redefined the meaning of “responsible authority to include
certain kinds of private parties:26
The responsible authority, being held as such, despite of its formal
nature, the one that pronounces, orders, enforces or attempts to
enforce the act that creates, modifies, or terminates legal situations
in a unilateral and obligatory manner; or fails to perform the act, that
if performed, it would create, modify or terminate such legal
situations. For the purpose of this Law, private parties will be held
as a responsible authority when they perform acts equivalent to
those of an authority, that affect rights in terms of this section, and
whose functions are determined by a general law.27
The inclusion of private parties within the meaning of “responsible authority”
exposed arbitrators to amparo actions, such that a party to arbitration could sue an arbitrator
for constitutional rights violations.28 Nonetheless, in 2015, Mexican courts addressed the
threat to arbitration holding that arbitrators cannot be considered “responsible authorities”
for purposes of amparo, because arbitrators are privately contracted by the parties and,
therefore, do not perform acts equivalent to a governmental authority.29 The courts’
recognition of inapplicability of amparo claims against arbitrators reinforced the private
nature of arbitration and set up precedent showing cooperative judicial behavior towards
arbitration.30 The protection against amparo claims clarified the role of the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which Mexico incorporated in 1993
as the law that ascertains the remedies against arbitrators in international commercial
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disputes.31 In addition to UNCITRAL, Mexico is a member of a series of conventions that
regulate international investment in oil and gas as well as dispute resolution, including the
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards.32 Furthermore, in 2017, a new Mexican law dealing with alternative dispute
resolution recognized the right to arbitrate as a constitutional right.33
Nonetheless, the Mexican government has historically established certain
limitations to the subject matter of arbitration. For example, criminal matters and amparo
claims are by definition, inarbitrable under Mexican law.34
III.

CONTRACTS UNDER THE HYDROCARBONS LAW
A. Hydrocarbons Law

The regulation of the energy sector in Mexico falls exclusively under federal
jurisdiction.35 The Hydrocarbons Law is federal legislation that largely controls investment
contracts in the oil and gas sector, as well as the structure of the industry. 36 And although
the 2013 amendment effectively opened the sector’s doors to foreign and private investors,
the Mexican federal government did not give up all of its previous sovereign control over
the exploration and production of oil and gas.37
Under the Hydrocarbons Law, private and foreign investors may enter into private
agreements with the Mexican State or with the state-owned productive company –
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) – in exchange for a license to the exploitation and
31
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production of oil and gas in Mexican territory.38 These licenses function like contracts, not
like concessions, such that investors only obtain a share of the production.39 The
Hydrocarbons Law sets up a series of rules and limitations that the contracting parties must
follow when entering into an agreement. First, under Article 19, Section VIII, the
Hydrocarbons Law requires the inclusion of an administrative rescission clause in oil and
gas exploration and production contracts.40 Next, Article 20 lists the minimum
circumstances for the invocation of administrative rescission:
The Executive Branch, through the National Hydrocarbons
Commission shall have the right to administratively rescind the
Exploration and Production Agreements and recover the
Contractual Area if any of the following serious conditions occur: I.
That for more than one hundred and eighty calendar and continuous
days, the Operator does not commence or suspends the activities
included in the plan for the exploration or production of the
contacting area, without due cause or approval form the National
Hydrocarbons Commission. II. The Operator fails to comply with
the minimum work commitment, without due cause as per the terms
and conditions of the exploration and production agreement; III. If
the Operator assigns totally or partially, the operation or the rights
conferred in the exploration and production agreement without the
corresponding prior approval as per the terms specified in Article 15
of this Law; IV. The occurrence of a serious accident caused by the
willful misconduct or negligence of the Operator, which causes
damages to infrastructure, fatality and loss or production.41
And lastly, Article 21 establishes the inarbitrability of the administrative rescission
and the exclusive use of Mexican federal law for purposes of litigation:
The controversies related to the Exploration and Extraction
Contracts, except for the provisions of the preceding article, may be
resolved through alternative mechanisms, including arbitration
agreements in accordance with the provisions of Title IV Book V of
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the Commercial Code, international treaties on arbitration, and
dispute resolution to which Mexico is a party.
The National Hydrocarbons Commission will not be governed, in
any case, by foreign legislations. In any case, the arbitration
procedure will observe the following:
I. The applicable legislation will be the Federal Mexican Laws;
II. The arbitration procedure will be conducted in Spanish; and
III. The award shall be in strict law and shall be binding on both
parties.42
These three articles are the source of discussion when it comes to determining
Mexico’s policy on arbitration. Although together, Articles 20 and 21 seem to promote
arbitration, the limitations imposed in Article 21 have greater consequences than may be
seen in the face of the statute.43
Under Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law, arbitration and other alternative dispute
resolution methods are available to control over contractual disputes between the State and
foreign/private investors for the exploration and production of oil and gas.44 The available
methods of alternative dispute resolution are those included in the Mexican Commercial
Code, and, in the case of arbitration, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration applies.45 Although oil and gas exploration and production
contracts are subject to the Hydrocarbons Law, these contracts are governed by commercial
law, as expressly stated in Article 92 of the Hydrocarbons Law:
For matters not provided in this law, the acts of the Hydrocarbon
industry will be deemed commercial acts, and will be governed by
the Commercial Code, and by the Federal Civil Code as
supplementary law.46
The existence of arbitration provides security for the investors, as it allows them to
have a level of control over their own destiny in case a dispute should arise with the
42
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Mexican government.47 Thus, arbitration in the context of the energy sector, incentivizes
foreign investment in Mexico, which was the original goal of the energy reform.48
B. The Administrative Rescission
The Hydrocarbons Law allows private and foreign investors to enter into oil and
gas exploration and production contracts with the Mexican government.49 For all purposes,
these agreements function as commercial contracts, under commercial contract law,
notwithstanding the limitations that the Hydrocarbons Law imposes.50
Under Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Law, contracts between the Mexican State
and private investors must include an administrative rescission clause.51 The administrative
rescission clause is a specific type of rescission that only the State, or State representative,
may invoke, and the private party may only challenge an administrative rescission through
judicial trial. In essence, when certain circumstances arise, an administrative rescission
allows the State to unilaterally rescind contracts with private investors.52 Article 20 of the
Hydrocarbons Law includes the minimum circumstances which allow the State to enact an
administrative rescission.53 In summary, Article 20 gives the State permission to invoke
the administrative rescission clause when the private party commits gross nonperformance.54 Accordingly, if any or all of the circumstances in Article 20 ensue and the
State moves forward with an administrative rescission, the contract between the State and
the private party becomes void.55 Paragraph 6 of Article 20 also establishes that after the
invocation of an administrative rescission, the investor must transfer the “contract area”
47
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back to the State without receiving any compensation or payment,56 with the exception of
sunk costs.57
C. Arbitration under the Hydrocarbons Law
Natural questions arise about the relationship of the administrative rescission clause
and arbitration in agreements between the State and private investors. Commentators
generally consider the Mexican government’s use of the administrative rescission to be an
excessive imposition of authority over investors.58 Some even believe that the
administrative rescission is clearly contrary to the foreign investment standards of
treatment in international treaties, including the right to arbitration.59 Thus, commentators
seem to agree that the Mexican State uses the arbitral procedure to favor the State over
investors. For these reasons, commentators often find the administrative rescission to be
divergent from the commercial nature of the Hydrocarbons Law.60
Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law explicitly prohibits matters related to the
administrative rescission from going to arbitration.61 In essence, if a dispute arises about
whether the private party committed gross non-performance, which would trigger the
option of administrative rescission, the dispute can only be decided by a Mexican federal
court and according to Mexican federal law.62
The Hydrocarbons Law was amended in 2014 to include the inarbitrability of the
administrative rescission following an amendment to the Public-Private Partnerships Law
in 2012, which established inarbitrability in matters dealing with any act of authority by a
State entity.63 The idea of such exclusion was first brought up by a case in 1997 before the
current Hydrocarbons Law was enacted, where Mexican courts addressed the precise

56
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question of whether a dispute over the administrative rescission was a matter for the courts
or arbitration.64
In COMMISA v. PEMEX, PEMEX – a State agency - exercised administrative
rescission to end the contractual relationship with COMMISA after a series of disputes,
unrelated to the administrative rescission, had arisen between the parties.65 In response,
COMMISA brought an amparo action against PEMEX claiming that the exercise of the
administrative rescission was unconstitutional.66 Mexico’s Supreme Court effected its
power to assume jurisdiction and delivered two important holdings on the issue.67 First, the
Court held that the State’s application of administrative rescission in hydrocarbons
contracts is constitutional.68 Second, the Court held that the State’s application of
administrative rescission qualifies as an exercise of authority under amparo law, which
renders the application of an administrative rescission inarbitrable.69
By deeming the administrative rescission a valid exercise of authority under amparo
law, COMMISA indirectly established the inarbitrability of the administrative rescission,
because Mexican amparo law clearly prohibits arbitration of amparo claims.70 Any
objection to an administrative rescission would, thus, be inarbitrable, making the parties’
agreement to arbitrate superfluous,71 and increasing the possibility that the State will
invoke an administrative rescission for arbitrary reasons.72
This tension has not been relieved, but was made explicit in Article 21 of the
Hydrocarbons Law even though courts are poorly prepared to rule on such matters, as
judges are rarely experts in the field of exploration and production of oil and gas.73
Nonetheless, neither the COMMISA outcome nor the enactment of Article 21 come as a
surprise considering the sovereign meaning that the energy sector carries in Mexico.74
64
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One party in arbitration agreements usually holds greater power and influence over
the arbitration.75 In fact, States in the United States have tried to compensate the weaker
party by implementing special laws, but the States’ efforts have been continuously opposed
by the federal government arguing that such laws impose an unfair burden on arbitration,
and thus, contradict the federal policy on arbitration and the parties’ freedom of contract.76
Accordingly, there is a certain amount of disparate power between the parties that has been
accepted to protect the right to arbitrate, at least so in the United States.77
The contract scheme imposed by the Mexican Hydrocarbons Law is also
based on disparate power between the parties, in this case, to favor the State.78 But contrary
to the scheme in the United States, where the powerful party has an advantage in
arbitration, here, the Mexican State has an advantage because it can choose to forego
arbitration.79 Since the administrative rescission is inarbitrable under the Hydrocarbons
Law, Mexico’s courts have the sole power to decide when the administrative rescission
applies.80 In other words, the Mexican federal courts decide whether the private party
violated its agreement with the State under Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Law. This
policy renders the federal law permitting arbitration inoperable because, in every dispute,
the Mexican State can invoke an administrative rescission and wait for the court to
adjudicate.81
The current structure of the Hydrocarbons Law goes against the parties’ agreement
to arbitrate and also against Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law. 82 Nonetheless, the
Hydrocarbons Law is likely designed such that investors will seemingly run lower
investment risk when in actuality, the State maintains almost full discretion regarding the
exploration and production of oil and gas.

75

Jeremy McManus, A Motion to Compel Changes to Federal Arbitration Law: How to Remedy the Abuses
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IV.

IMPACT ON MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM
A. Reaction of Foreign Investors to Mexico’s Superior Control Over Contracts

Pursuant to the energy reform, the Hydrocarbons Law was written to boost the
nation’s economy.83 Investors would benefit from new opportunities and the State would
benefit from the economic reinvigoration that such investors would bring into the
country.84 However, the parties’ power imbalance in oil and gas exploration and production
contracts brings concerns to some investors.85 The contractual scheme set up under the
Hydrocarbons Law grants more power to the State than to investors.86 The State’s finance
is not put at risk, but that of private investors.87 Therefore, the contractual relationship
between the State and the investor should award the investor more power to reduce the
imbalance between the parties. Arbitration precisely serves to decrease the investor’s risk
when investing in the exploration and production of oil and gas in Mexican territory.88
However, the administrative rescission clause required under the Hydrocarbons
Law introduced a way for the State to regain all the power in the contractual relationship
because the mere existence of an administrative rescission clause coupled with its subject
matter inarbitrability renders the arbitral clause ineffectual.89 Consequently, arbitration as
a tool to minimize investment risk is unsuccessful in contracts for exploration and
production of oil and gas in Mexico.90
The inarbitrability of administrative rescission has not driven away all investors.91
According to a Houston-based oil sector lawyer, the risk of facing an inarbitrable
administrative rescission is more significant for smaller companies with lower risk

83
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thresholds.92 Nonetheless, all investors have to be very cautious about avoiding acts that
could trigger the administrative rescission under the Hydrocarbons Law.93
Undoubtedly, investors will be hesitant to invest in a country that imposes
limitations on arbitration and presents uncertainty in dispute resolution.94 Investment
cutbacks in the energy sector will not only affect the investors business but will have an
effect on the nation’s energy security, which relies on the success of the exploration and
production of oil and gas.95 Therefore, a fair balance of power between investors and the
State in exploration and production of oil and gas contracts is in the best interest of both
parties.
One could assume, that investors were willing to take the risk of facing an
inarbitrable administrative rescission under the previous government, because of a
multitude of signals demonstrating the state’s willingness to open its industries to foreign
investors and adhere to risk mitigation measures.96 With a political climate prone to
reforms and seeking the benefits of international trade, the risk of administrative rescission
was one investors were willing to bear.97 Under the new president-elect, however, the
administrative recession clause might prove to be the Achilles heel of invested foreign
entities.
B. The Newly Elected Mexican President
On August of this year, 2018, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) won the
presidential election in Mexico and will officially assume the presidency on December 1,
2018.98 Although AMLO belonged to different political parties throughout his multiple
presidential campaigns, his position remained consistent against neo-liberal policies and in
favor of populism.99 His populist and often controversial views lost him the presidency
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twice, until this past election.100 AMLO’s populist ideas provoke fear of outsiders,
especially when those outsiders are international investors coming into one of the country’s
most important sectors.101
Throughout his political career, AMLO has been vocal about his opposition to
Mexico’s energy reform.102 In fact, AMLO based his presidential campaign partly on a
resource nationalistic agenda.103 During his campaign, AMLO even stated that he would
not permit the nation’s oil “to return to foreign hands.”104
Nonetheless, AMLO is known as a pragmatic populist, and as such, there have been
some conflicting statements regarding AMLO’s position about the energy sector.105 On
one hand, AMLO’s advisers apparently met with American investors to assure them that
the energy sector in Mexico would remain open.106 On the other hand, AMLO stated that
measures would be taken to assess each existing oil and gas exploration and production
contract between the State and private investors.107
Given the conflicting opinions, it is impossible to predict what AMLO will do to
the energy reform once he assumes the presidency, but the administrative rescission might
give AMLO the means to change the course of the national resources politics towards more
protectionism and resource nationalism, without even a breach of contract.108 One could
further assume that independently of the path AMLO will choose in the coming months,
investment contracts in the oil and gas industry are likely to regress as investors will be
more cautious and less likely to bear the risk of an inarbitrable administrative rescission
clause.109
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C. Comparative Analysis: Venezuela
Venezuela holds one of the world’s largest oil reserves and during the time when
Venezuela reached its highest level of oil production in 1998, the nation had invited
international investors to participate in the nation’s oil production.110 In 2007, however,
Hugo Chavez demanded changes to oil production agreements between the Venezuelan
government and foreign investors that would increase the government’s control over the
contracts.111 The demand came after oil prices increased, so Chavez undertook a
nationalistic approach to protect the Venezuelan people.112 As a result of the modifications,
the Venezuelan government expropriated oil companies that refused to accept the changes,
including oil titans like ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips.113 In addition, Venezuela
denunciated its membership to ICSID, which imposed further obstacles for private
investors.114 Thereafter, from 1998 until 2015, Venezuela’s production of oil decreased by
approximately 30% and does not show any favorable signs for the near future.115
Venezuela’s plummeting oil prices resulted in hyperinflation and, today, Venezuela is in
crisis with many people attempting to flee the country to survive.116
Venezuela’s history and current state should serve as a message to Mexico that imposing
limitations on international oil and gas investment is not always the most beneficial for the
local economy and welfare.
V. CONCLUSION
Consistent with Mexico’s traditional resource nationalism policy, and the
entrenched culture of protecting the oil in its territory, Mexico has set some limits to its
historically arbitration-friendly attitude. Nonetheless, foreign investors have not been
deterred from investing in Mexico’s energy sector, and Mexico’s future in the oil and gas
industry seems promising, but this growth is now at risk due to politics.
A nation’s international investment policy is often affected by politics, and
currently, Mexico’s government is undergoing a drastic political change. AMLO’s election
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will likely bring turbulence to arbitration in Mexico, especially international arbitration in
the energy sector. AMLO’s populist approach could incentivize the federal government to
use the arbitration loophole that the administrative rescission offers to push out foreign
investors from the Mexican oil and gas industry without explicitly violating any
agreements. Such an act would result in Mexico essentially following the footsteps of
Chavez in Venezuela.
Therefore, Mexican legislators must fight against a reform rollback, which would
not only cause Mexico’s arbitration policy to digress but would also fracture Mexico’s
already fragile relationships with foreign investors.
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